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COMMENTS
PACKING HEAT? DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S AUTHORITY TO PROTECT
AMERICA'S AIRPORTS
Moira Bergin+
The outcome of America's latest federalism battle could have lasting effects
on the federal government's ability to enforce regulations intended to protect
Americans from future terrorist attacks. While some of the players are new,
the plot is old.
On May 14, 2008, the governor of Georgia signed into law legislation
permitting licensed individuals to carry concealed firearms in certain public
2places. This legislation, the Business Security and Employee Privacy Act,
allows the concealed carry of firearms "in all parks, historic sites, and
recreational areas ... and in public transportation," subject to federal statutory
prohibitions.
3
When the Act took effect on July 1, 2008,4 the general manager of the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport-which is owned by the city
of Atlanta 5-released a statement declaring the airport a "gun-free zone. ' 6 The
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2003, University of Maryland. The author wishes to thank her parents and sister for their
love and guidance, and the superb staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their hard work
and patience.
1. Compare GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1282 (N.D.
Ga. 2008), aff'd, 318 F. App'x 851 (1 1th Cir. 2009), with Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Hawley, 543 F. Supp. 2d 44, 45 (D.D.C. 2008). See also Press Release, Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta Int'l Airport, General Manager Releases Statement Declaring Airport a Gun-Free Zone
(July 1, 2008), http://www.atlanta-airport.com/fifthlnewsroom/PressReleaseArticle.aspx?id=
572.
2. Business Security and Employee Privacy Act § 4(e), 2008 Ga. Laws 1199, 1202
(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(e) (2009)).
3. Id. While this legislation acknowledges possible federal law conflicts, a related Georgia
statute reserves the internal regulation of firearms solely to state law, and prohibits municipalities
within Georgia from enacting ordinances or other laws pertaining to the sale, transport,
ownership, or carriage of firearms. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-173 (2007).
4. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127; Press Release, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int'l
Airport, supra note 1.
5. Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int'l Airport, ATL Fact Sheet, http://www.atlanta-airport.
com/Airport/ATL/ATL Factsheet.aspx (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
6. Press Release, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int'l Airport, supra note 1.
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general manager cited section 16-11-127 of the Georgia Code-which bars
firearms at public gatherings-as the legal basis for issuing the declaration.
7
Additionally, the general manager expressed concern that the presence of
firearms at the world's most-traveled airport would significantly jeopardize the
safety and security of daily operations.
8
Georgia State Assemblyman Tim Bearden, the sponsor of the Act,9 and
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., a gun-rights advocacy group, 10 filed suit against the
city of Atlanta in federal court on July 1, 2008, alleging that the airport gun
ban violated section 16-11-173 of the Georgia Code and various provisions of
the United States Constitution. 1" In response, the city of Atlanta asserted that
the language of the Act which allows licensed individuals to carry concealed
weapons on public transportation did not apply to airports and, therefore, did
12not conflict with section 16-11-173. In addition, the City raised a
counterclaim alleging that the Georgia statute, if applicable to airports, violated
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because federal
legislation regulates security programs at domestic civil airports. 13 While the
case was pending, the Atlanta airport petitioned the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to modify its Airport Security Plan to ban firearms
throughout the Hartsfield-Jackson Airport complex.
14
The district court eventually dismissed the gun-rights group's lawsuit,
finding that the Act did not apply to airports, 5 and the Court of Appeals for the
7. Id; see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(a)-(b) ("'[P]ublic gathering' shall include, but shall
not be limited to ... publicly owned or operated buildings .... ").
8. Press Release, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int'l Airport, supra note 1. The general
manager, in his statement, also agreed with the President of the American Association of Airport
Executives, who earlier emphasized the vulnerabilities in aviation security that were highlighted
after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Id. Ultimately, the general manager stated that,
notwithstanding the enactment of the Act, individuals carrying a concealed firearm anywhere on
the airport's property would be committing a misdemeanor. Id; Associated Press, Lawsuit Filed
Over Atlanta Airport Barring Guns, MSNBC.cOM, July 1, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
25479434/.
9. Business Security and Employee Privacy Act § 4(e), 2008 Ga. Laws 1199, 1202
(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(e) (2009)).
10. GeorgiaCarry.Org: Fighting for Your Right to Bear Arms, http://www.georgiacarry.org.
11. Complaint at 1, 7-9, GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (No. I:08-CV-2171-MHS), affd, 318 F. App'x 851 (11th Cir. 2009); see also
John Sullivan, Airport's Ban on Guns is Disputed in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at A12.
12. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
13. Answer and Counterclaims at 14, 17, GeorgiaCarry.Org, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281.
14. Thomas Frank, TSA Weighs Airport Gun Ban, USA TODAY, Aug. 8-10, 2008, at IA.
Concurrently, the federal district court refused GeorgiaCarry.Org's initial request for a temporary
injunction to prevent the airport from enforcing its gun ban. Bill Rankin, Judge Rules: No Guns
in Airport, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.ajc.com/gwinnett/content/
metro/atlanta/stories/2008/08/1 1/guns at airport.html.
15. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87.
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Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' 6 This disposition leaves unanswered the question
that is the focus of this Comment: whether federal statutes and regulations
pertaining to airport security preclude state legislation permitting concealed
firearms at airports.
The federal government has regulated aviation safety and security standards
since 1926, enacting statutes and regulations under its constitutional authority
to regulate interstate commerce.' 7 Federal control over aviation has expanded
as new threats to aviation security have emerged during the subsequent
decades.18 Congressional legislation concerning aviation has had two main
objectives: (1) ensuring the viability of the airline industry as a vehicle for
economic growth and (2) making air travel safe. 19
These goals were reflected in two pieces of federal legislation regarding
aviation enacted in response to the devastating terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. The first statute, passed only ten days after the attacks, was a
bailout designed to stabilize the cash-strapped aviation industry. 21 The second
statute, passed immediately before Thanksgiving in 2001, was designed to
restore public confidence in air transportation. 22  The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), among other things, created TSA by
consolidating the transportation security functions of several federal
23
agencies. This statute provides specific directives regarding airport security
16. GeorgiaCarry.Org v. City of Atlanta, 318 F. App'x 851, 852 (lth Cir. 2009)
(unpublished per curiam opinion).
17. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731; Air Commerce Act
of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, Ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (repealed 1958).
18. Kent C. Krause, Putting the Transportation Security Administration in Historical
Context, 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 233, 234 (2003).
19. See ALEXANDER T. WELLS, AIRPORT PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, 7-9, 12-17, 22
(2d ed. 1992).
20. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against
Terrorism, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 712-13 (2003).
21. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 101, 115
Stat. 230, 230 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101). During debate of the bailout, Senator
Jay Rockefeller stressed, "'[i]f planes don't fly, much of the economy shuts down."' Jill
Zuckman, Congress Votes Air Industry $15 Million, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2001, at 1.
22. See 147 CONG. REC. H8300, H8301 (2001) (statement of Rep. Young) (expressing the
legislation's objectives, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Don
Young explained, "people flying on American airlines will know that that plane is going to arrive
safely at their destination without the opportunity of any future terrorism"); id. (statement of Rep.
Oberstar) (agreeing with Chairman Young, committee Ranking Member James Oberstar
observed, "[the ATSA] will substantially enhance security and restore airline finances more than
[the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act] that was passed a few days ago").
23. Krause, supra note 18, at 250. Under the ATSA, the TSA acquired greater law
enforcement power than had been vested in agencies that had previously performed transportation
security activities, reflecting Congress's intent to more vigorously combat threats to the national
transportation system. See Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and
the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REv. 673, 686 (2006); Krause, supra note
18, at 250.
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check points24 and gives TSA authority over general airport security.
However, the full scope of TSA's general airport security authority has not yet
been defined.26
When TSA received the city of Atlanta's request to ban concealed firearms
on all airport property, a spokesman released a statement implying that TSA
was unsure whether it had the authority to approve such a request.27  The
Georgia district court's decision to dismiss GeorgiaCarry.Org's complaint
provided no additional guidance as to the scope of TSA's authority, because
the grounds for dismissal were unrelated to federal airport security.
28
For TSA to assert legitimate authority, airports must fall within Congress's
powers to regulate and Congress must have delegated that regulation authority
to TSA. Given the lack of relevant case law, the scope of TSA's authority is
assessed best: (1) through analysis of the ATSA's language and legislative
history; (2) through case law resolving questions challenging the authority of
the Federal Aviation Administration and similar federal agencies; and (3) by
analyzing recent trends in judicial interpretation of the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses.
This Comment seeks to determine the scope of TSA's authority by
examining the history of federal aviation regulation, the new challenges to
ensuring aviation security, and jurisprudence regarding the scope of federal
power under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses. First, this Comment
provides a brief description of the underlying delegation powers possessed by
Congress that determine the scope of agency administrative authority. Next, it
analyzes past federal aviation laws to demonstrate that Congress has
deliberately increased the role of federal regulators in aviation security over
time to protect airports and air travel as a channel of interstate commerce. This
Comment then considers the ATSA's legislative history and the regulations
24. 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)-(b) (2006).
25. 49 U.S.C. § 1 14(d)(1), (f).
26. Id. § 114 (f)(11). Because TSA was created less than a decade ago, case law defining
the scope of its authority is limited.
27. Frank, supra note 14 (describing the city of Atlanta's request as raising "some complex
legal issues," a TSA spokesperson emphasized that "[a]ny decisions we make that affect (Atlanta)
could affect every other airport in the country"). In an August 7, 2008, letter to the House
Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Bennie Thompson regarding the authority of TSA to
ban guns throughout airport property, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistant
Secretary Kip Hawley acknowledged that TSA has "the authority to issue regulations and security
directives and to approve airport security programs," but remained uncertain as to whether that
authority extended to the power to ban guns. Letter from Kip Hawley, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of
Homeland Sec., to Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec. (Aug. 7, 2008)
(on file with author). Specifically, Hawley stated "[w]ith respect to firearms, state and local law
has traditionally determined the legal implications for carrying firearms on airport property
outside of restricted areas such as the sterile area." Id. Further, he asserted that "[flederal law
anticipates that persons other than law enforcement officers will have firearms at airports." Id.
28. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286-87 (N.D. Ga. 2008),
aff'd, 318 F. App'x 851, 852 (11 th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per curiam opinion).
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that TSA has promulgated to implement the statute. This portion of the
analysis illustrates the comprehensive and pervasive nature of federal
regulations that preempt state regulations. This Comment then discusses case
law defining the scope of authority under the Commerce and Supremacy
Clauses held by previous agencies charged with transportation security. It then
analyzes current case law interpretations of the Commerce and Supremacy
Clauses to support the conclusion that TSA has authority over the security
operations throughout airports, not merely at screening checkpoints and within
secured areas. This Comment ultimately concludes that TSA's authority to
impose security regulations is not limited to areas within security checkpoints,
but exists throughout the airport property and that TSA must exercise this
authority to fulfill its mandate under ATSA.
I. THE HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF AVIATION REGULATION:
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A STRONGER FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME
GOVERNING AIRPORT SECURITY
A. The Delegation Doctrine Allows Congress to Vest Agencies with
Regulatory Authority
Although the Constitution demands that Congress carry out the legislative
duties enumerated in Article I, Congress is permitted to delegate certain duties
to administrative agencies under the Necessary and Proper Clause.29  The
powers delegated by Congress must bear an "intelligible principle" to which
the agency's actions must conform, meaning that Congress must limit the
agency's power to implement congressional policies, rather than allow the
agency to develop its own policies. Despite case law insisting on firm
boundaries to powers delegated by Congress, 3 1 the Supreme Court has held
that broad grants of authority are consistent with constitutional separation of
powers. For example, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, the
Court found that the terms "public interest, convenience, or necessity"
sufficiently limited the Federal Communication Commission's regulatory
authority, thereby dismissing a non-delegation doctrine challenge.33
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935) (reiterating that Congress is permitted to delegate authority to
administrative agencies to promulgate rules and regulations on a particular topic within a defined
scope to achieve congressionally defined objectives).
30. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529-30; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 (1912).
32. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17, 225-26 (1943).
33. Id. at 216; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-74 (2001)
(finding that the phrases "requisite to protect the public health" and "adequate margin of safety,"
as included in the Clean Air Act, provided sufficient direction to the Environmental Protection
Agency and sufficiently limited the agency's power to withstand a separation of powers attack).
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Thus, under the non-delegation doctrine agencies can only act at the explicit
behest of Congress.34 When Congress makes its intent clear through a statute,
the agency has no power to impose its own interpretation and must carry out
the statute's commands. 35 The agency is not permitted to establish a policy
contrary to what Congress intended.36
B. Congress Enacts Increasingly Pervasive Legislation to Ensure Federal
Control ofAir Transportation Security
The history of federal aviation law provides important insight into the basis,
purpose, and scope of TSA's authority. 37 Since the inception of commercial
aviation, the federal government has viewed the aviation sector as a
fundamental mode of American commerce.38  Federal regulation of the
aviation industry began in 1926 when Congress passed the Air Commerce
Act.39 While the legislation included some security provisions, 40 Congress's
primary goal was to provide a framework of federal regulations that would
enable the American economy to fully exploit the potential of aviation.
41
Under the Air Commerce Act, the Secretary of Commerce could regulate air
traffic and pilot licensing in civil aviation,42 but municipalities retained control
over airports and landing fields as long as local rules did not interfere with
interstate commerce.43
34. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
35. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
36. NORMAND J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 65:1 (7th ed. 2008) ("Where an agency has been charged with administering a
law, it may not substitute its own policy for that of the legislature.").
37. Cf Krause, supra note 18, at 250.
38. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235, 276
(2003).
39. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, § 344, 44 Stat. 568, 568-69 (repealed
1958).
40. Id § 344, 44 Stat. at 571 (preserving the War Department's power to designate certain
routes as military airways); id § 344, 44 Stat. at 572 ("The Congress hereby declares that the
Government of the United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete sovereignty
of the airspace over the lands and waters of the United States .... ).
41. See id. § 344, 44 Stat. at 568-69. The Air Commerce Act charged the Secretary of
Commerce with assessing aviation development, implementing policies to facilitate growth of air
commerce, and ensuring public confidence in aviation by reporting findings of its air
transportation accident investigations. Id.; see also Current Legislation: The Air Commerce Act
of 1926, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 989, 990-91 (1927) (explaining legislative provisions regarding the
investment in meteorological technology and establishing emergency landing fields to encourage
public confidence in air travel).
42. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief history/index.cfm?print-go (last
visited Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter BRIEF HISTORY].
43. Air Commerce Act § 344, 44 Stat. at 570; see GEORGE W. LUPTON, JR., CIVIL
AVIATION LAW 101-02 (1935) (refuting claims that Congress surrendered complete control of
airports to local governments because it retained power to regulate "where 'essential to the
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Over the next thirty years, the structure of federal aviation regulation
changed, but the encouragement of air commerce remained its goal.
44
Following two widely publicized airplane crashes, Congress passed the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, which established the Federal Aviation Agency-an
independent agency which reported directly to the president.45  Despite its
aggressive approach in imposing federal regulation on the aviation industry,46
Congress continued to leave the operation of civil airports to local government
operators subject to compliance with federal statutes and inspection by the
Federal Aviation Agency administrator.
47
In response to an onslaught of terrorist airline hijackings beginning in the
1960s,48 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 49 further expanded itsauthority over aviation security to reduce risks of terrorist hijackings.50
protection of interstate commerce"' (citation omitted)); Current Legislation, supra note 41, at 992
("[A]ir ports can better be regulated by municipalities which through their police power can enact
ordinances pertaining to the lives, health, and property of their residents and maintenance of good
order.").
44. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 42. See Federal Airport Act, Pub. L. No. 79-377, § 251, 60
Stat. 170, 171-72, 176-77 (1946) (amended 1994) (directing the Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics to provide localities with federal funds to construct airports and provide office space
at no cost to federal agencies performing air traffic control or necessary meteorological
activities); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 601, 52 Stat. 973, 984-86
(repealed 1958) (directing the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics to draft annual comprehensive
national airport development plans and to provide localities with federal funds to construct
airports).
45. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731; John W. Gelder,
Comment, Air Law-The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1214-15 (1959).
Congress created the Agency to, among other things, instill confidence in the safety of air
transportation for both passengers and businesses that would use it for shipping. George A.
Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation with Counterpart Agencies Abroad: The FAA's Aircraft
Certification Experience, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 669, 674-75 (1993). The legislation
marked Congress's effort to consolidate all aviation oversight functions into one federal entity.
Gelder, supra, at 1215. Congress charged the FAA with promoting air commerce, implementing
universal air traffic safety rules, operating air traffic control facilities, and approving airport
development plans. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 307(a)-(c), 72 Stat. at 749-50; § 309, 72
Stat. at 75 1 (barring construction of non-federally funded airports or landing areas without FAA
approval); § 307, 72 Stat. at 749-50, 806 (repealing the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 and consolidating authority over military and civil regulation of all
navigable airspace under the FAA Administrator).
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. See Federal Aviation Act § 1402(b), 72 Stat. at 806; Federal Airport Act § 11, 60 Stat.
170, 176 (1946) (noting that airport operators must comply with requests from the federal
administrator); Kristin L. Falzone, Airport Noise Pollution: Is There a Solution in Sight?, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 769, 781-82 (1999) (tracing federal oversight of airports with respect to
noise pollution).
48. Krause, supra note 18, at 234.
49. See Department of Transportation Act, § 3(2), 80 Stat. 931, 932 (1966) (changing the
Federal Aviation Agency's name to the Federal Aviation Administration).
50. Krause, supra note 18, at 234, 236; BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 42. In 1966, the Federal
Aviation Agency's name was changed to the Federal Aviation Administration and it was
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Congress continued to aggressively expand the FAA's role in airport security
through the 1990s." By 2001, the FAA had the authority to oversee air
carriers' passenger screening procedures, respond to threats to civil aviation,
and demand that foreign airports meet certain security standards.52 Despite its
growing role in aviation security, FAA regulations issued pursuant to federal
law provided only patchwork protections that were insufficient to counter
emerging threats to aviation security.
53
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era of aviation
regulation. 54  In a sweeping effort to federalize airport security, Congress
incorporated within the newly established Department of Transportation (DOT). Department of
Transportation Act § 3(e)(1)-(2), 80 Stat. at 932.
51. See Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, §§ 101-12, 104
Stat. 3066, 3067, 3069-70. After the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988, Congress
created two transportation security posts-the Director of Intelligence Security within the Office
of the Secretary of DOT and the Administrator for Civil Aviation Security-and charged the
FAA with facilitating federal oversight of security operations at major domestic airports by
enacting the Aviation Security Improvement Act. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 707-08. Although
the FAA was granted broad power to regulate airport security under the legislation, its role was
primarily indirect-to supervise the security plans of air carriers and airport operators, conduct
tests to gauge the efficiency of the screening procedures, and make recommendations for
improvements. § 106, 104 Stat. at 3075-76. However, Congress also expanded the power of the
FAA beyond screening and security plans in its effort to ensure aviation security by granting the
FAA the authority to issue regulations on airport construction, which is an essential element of
aviation security. § 110, 104 Stat. at 3080.
The DOT's and the FAA's new security responsibilities increased the federal role in aviation
security, demonstrating Congress's recognition that security is a vital aspect of national
transportation policy and that securing transportation infrastructure is essential to national
security. See Dempsey, supra note 20 at 707-08. For a detailed synopsis of federal aviation
laws, see id. at 697-98.
52. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIR COMMERCE AND THE LAW 652
(2004).
53. Krause, supra note 18, at 235-36; see also ROGER W. COBB & DAVID M. PRIMO, THE
PLANE TRUTH 123 (2003) (highlighting the FAA's close relationship with the airlines and its
aversion to imposing strict security guidelines); DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 52, at 656
(listing criticisms of the FAA, including that the FAA was "in a time warp, resistant to change,
defensive, and turf-conscious... and a self-perpetuating bureaucratic morass of inaction and self-
protection" (internal quotation marks omitted)); ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AIRPORT
REGULATION, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 135 (1991) (explaining that the FAA's lack of "direct
operational" authority diminished the Administration's ability to demand accountability among
the airlines and airport operators, thereby jeopardizing airport security). For additional criticisms
of the FAA's security procedures and an analysis of how such procedures might affect TSA, see
Gregory Robert Schroer, Doomed to Repeat the Past: How the TSA is Picking Up Where the FAA
Left Off, 32 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 73-74 (2004).
54. See Editorial, Make Federalization of Airline Security a Priority, THE HILL, Nov. 14,
2001, at 40 (arguing that the federal government must take over airport security to prevent future
terrorist attacks); KARL AGNE, DEMOCRACY CORPS, AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLLING, WEEK
ENDING NOVEMBER 2, 2001, 3 (2001), http://archive.democracycorps.com/weekly/Public_
Polling-Report November_2_2001.rft (reporting that a Zogby Poll found that seventy percent of
Americans supported federalizing airport security and that a New York Times poll indicated that
fifty-two percent of Americans supported federal airport security regulation).
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established TSA within the Department of Transportation (DOT).55
Congress's goal in creating TSA was to establish one federal entity with the
authority to monitor threats to national transportation infrastructure and to
implement a uniform transportation security protocol. 6  TSA, therefore,
consolidated the security functions of numerous transportation agencies. 57 In
aviation, Congress shifted all airport security functions previously overseen by
the FAA to TSA.58
The language in the ATSA delegated plenary authority over airport security
to TSA and enumerated a list of specific security responsibilities to be
implemented.59 Specifically, the ATSA stated that TSA "shall be responsible
for security in all modes of transportation, including . . . civil aviation
security" 60 and shall "oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of
security measures at airports.''61 Additionally, the ATSA charged TSA with
federalizing airport security screening programs.6 2  In that respect, TSA's
authority to regulate airport activity is more robust than the authority that the
FAA had previously enjoyed.63 While the FAA merely approved the screening
programs carried out by air carriers,6 4 TSA now directly promulgates screening
procedures and employs the screeners.
65
In addition to the directives relating to the federalization of airport screening
personnel and the oversight of daily airport security operations, TSA inherited
the FAA's expansive administrative authority to issue regulations in pursuit of
55. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 597
(2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 114-115 (2006)); see also Andrew Hessick, The Federalization
ofAirport Security: Privacy Implications, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 43, 51-52 (2002). Immediately
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the number of Americans choosing air travel
plummeted. In response, Congress swiftly passed a $15 billion airline bailout, known as the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, to prevent domestic airliners from going out
of business. Zuckman, supra note 21.
56. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(d), (f) (2006).
57. Krause, supra note 18, at 247.
58. 49 U.S.C. § 45107 (2006).
59. 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)-(f).
60. Id. § 114(d) (emphasis added).
61. Id. § I 14(f)(1 1) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 114(e). The statute provides that TSA "shall be responsible for day-to-day
screening operations for passenger air transportation." Id. By directing the TSA to establish
employment criteria, employee retention plans, and training and evaluation programs for airport
screening personnel, the ATSA fully federalized airport screening procedures. Id. Congress's
deliberate step to require TSA to conduct all airport passenger screening, in an effort to bring
national uniformity to airport security, was preceded by a heated congressional debate. Hessick,
supra note 55, at 48-52. While some airports were permitted to continue utilizing private
screening contractors, their screening protocols were required to meet TSA's specifications. Id.
at 52.
63. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 114(e), with 14 C.F.R. § 108.25 (2001).
64. 14 C.F.R. § 108.25.
65. 49 U.S.C. § 114(e).
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66its security mission. Further, under the ATSA, TSA was instructed to
"develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to
transportation security," G to "carry out such other duties, and exercise such
other powers, relating to transportation security as the Under Secretary
considers appropriate, to the extent authorized by law,"68 and to "take
necessary actions to improve domestic air transportation security by correcting
any deficiencies in that security."69 Indeed, Congress directed TSA to ensure
proper security' measures were in place at airports even "before entry into a
secured area.'
Recognizing that aviation security is critical to federal domestic security
71programs, Congress shifted TSA from the DOT to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.72 At that
time, it was well-documented that nearly one-third of terrorist strikes
66. See id. § 114(1); Krause, supra note 18, at 250; David T. Norton, Recent Developments
in Aviation Law, 67 J. AIRL. & COM. 1107, 1118, 1120 (2002) (explaining that TSA will "eclipse
the FAA in size and scope" and that the Under Secretary's broad authority includes discretionary
power to impose biological and chemical technology requirements upon airports).
67. 49 U.S.C. §114(0(3).
68. Id. §114(0(15) (emphasis added).
69. 49 U.S.C. § 44904(e).
70. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(h)(4)(A).
71. See Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 5005 Before the H.
Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 107th Cong. 113 (2002) [hereinafter House Homeland
Security Act Hearing] (statement of Rep. DeLay, Member, H. Select Comm. on Homeland
Security) ("The TSA was put under the Department of Transportation for whatever reason ....
[B]ut it's not a transportation agency, it's a security agency. It's a security office."); id. at 153-54
(statement of Rep. Tauscher, Member, H. Select Comm. on Homeland Security) (supporting the
move of TSA to the DHS, but recommending that Congress delay the transfer until TSA met
previously established program deadlines); 148 CONG. REC. 22132 (2002) (statement of Rep.
Dingell) (opposing the shift of TSA to the DHS due to the concern that the hurried transfer would
result in "confusion" and "bureaucratic chaos," and because of lingering doubts about the
effectiveness of the new department, but recognizing that airport security is essential to domestic
security and should be regulated by a federal entity); Press Statement, S. Governmental Affairs
Comm., Lieberman States the Case for Homeland Security Department (Aug. 30, 2002),
http://hsgac.house.gov/public/_archive1083002press.htm (identifying transportation security as
an essential function of the new DHS and claiming that Congress's failure to consolidate
domestic security agencies would leave the country "ill equipped to defend against our terrorist
enemies"); see also Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
to Kip Hawley, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. (July 21, 2008) (on file with author)
(weighing in on Atlanta's request to ban concealed weapons at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport, expressing his belief that TSA had the authority to ban weapons throughout
the airport because "do[ing] otherwise would hamper TSA's ability to keep our airports secure").
The belief that aviation security was an essential element of homeland security was well
established even before the concept of the DHS came to fruition. The House Conference Report
accompanying the passage of ATSA, enacted one year before the Homeland Security Act,
concluded "that the safety and security of the civil air transportation system is critical to the
security of the United States and its national defense." H.R. REP. NO. 107-296 at 53-54 (2001)
(Conf. Rep.).
72. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178.
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throughout the world involved attacks against a segment of the transportation
infrastructure.7 3 By shifting TSA from the DOT to the DHS, Congress
emphasized its vision of transportation security as an essential component of
homeland security that should fall under federal control.74
C. TSA Defines Its Authority by Issuing Comprehensive Regulations to
Improve Airport Security
Regulations promulgated by TSA further illuminate its authority and
demonstrate its role in developing and controlling airport security.75 Under the
73. ROBERT S. KIRK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. RS21244, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY: SHOULD THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BE
INCLUDED? 4 (2002), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshalL/crsreports/crs
documents/RS21244_07242002.pdf.
Shifting TSA from the DOT to the DHS also reflected a consensus reached among Bush
Administration officials regarding "the importance of transportation security as a major part of
America's overall homeland security." House Homeland Security Act Hearing, supra note 72, at
94 (statement of Norm Mineta, Secretary of Transportation). Then-Secretary of Transportation
Norm Mineta commented: "I believe that it is impossible to create a Department of Homeland
Security and not have agencies like.., the Transportation Security Administration at the heart of
it." Id.
74. See Dempsey, supra note 20, at 717-18. Although one component of the DOT's
mission is to ensure the safety of transportation infrastructure, the DOT's traditional focus has
been facilitating the quick and efficient movement of people and goods. See U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANsP., ABOUT DOT, http://www.dot.gov/about dot.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009); U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., A BRIEF HISTORY, http://dotlibrary.dot.gov/Historian/history.htm (last visited
Oct. 7, 2009) (summarizing the history of the DOT, including its functions and missions). This
objective could, at times, be at odds with the security practices necessary to protect aviation. See
COBB & PRIMO, supra note 53, at 123. The Department of Homeland Security's primary
mission, however, is to promote nationwide domestic security and prevent future terrorist attacks.
See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ONE TEAM, ONE MISSION, SECURING OUR HOMELAND 3
(2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHSStratPlan_FINALspread.pdf ("We
will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks
and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. We will secure our national
borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade."). TSA's mission is to "protect[]
the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce."
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., MISSION, VISION, AND CORE VALUES, http://www.tsa.gov/who-we-are/
mission.shtm (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
75. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1542.5 (2008) (granting TSA the right to inspect airports for
compliance with their Airport Security Plans at any time); 49 C.F.R. § 1542.101(a) (2008)
(requiring airports to comply with TSA regulations and reserving the authority to approve or
reject Airport Security Plans submitted by airports). Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary of the
DHS, described the nineteen layers of security that TSA has implemented at domestic airports,
specifically stating: "Within airports themselves, TSA is focusing beyond the physical
checkpoint-to push our borders out, so to speak-to look more at people and to identify those
with hostile intent ... even if they are not carrying a prohibited item." One Year Later: Have
TSA Airport Security Checkpoints Improved?, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 31-34 (2007) (statement of Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security) TSA's layered security program begins "before a
passenger even shows up at a TSA checkpoint.") (emphasis added); see also Travel vs.
Terrorism: Federal Workforce Issues in Managing Airport Security, Hearing Before the H.
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Code of Federal Regulations section entitled "Airport Security,, 76 TSA
requires every airport to submit an Airport Security Program to the Under
Secretary for approval.77 To earn TSA's approval, airport operators' security
plans must "[p]rovide[] for the safety and security of persons and property on
an aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air transportation against
an act of criminal violence, aircraft piracy, and the introduction of an
unauthorized weapon... onto an aircraft., 78 Airport Security Programs can be
modified at TSA's discretion when it determines that "safety and the public
interest" necessitate amendment, 79 or when an airport operator requests a
modification that TSA finds will promote "safety and the public interest."
80
In addition to approving and implementing airport security plans, TSA
requires all airport operators to establish clearly marked security checkpoints
to prevent unauthorized entry into secured areas. 81 All passengers are required
to undergo TSA screening at these designated checkpoints. 82 All weapons are
barred in secured areas, 83 and TSA imposes a fine of up to $6000 on any
individual interfering with or undermining its security measures. 84  These
detailed airport security regulations form a comprehensive, nationally uniform
framework of security requirements with which all airport operators must
comply. 8
5
Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce and Agency Organization of the Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th
Cong. 56-62 (2006) (statement of Robert Jamison, Deputy Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration) (reporting TSA's progress in improving airport security, including the
implementation of a layered security plan that protects against terrorist attacks by screening
airport employees, installing security equipment in airports, and issuing airport security
regulations).
76. 49 C.F.R. § 1542 (2008).
77. 49 C.F.R. § 1542.101 (2008). Every Airport Security Plan must include "[a] description
of the sterile areas," airline operations areas, security identification display areas, and boundaries
of secured areas. 49 C.F.R. § 1542.103.
78. 49 C.F.R. § 1542.101(a)(1). TSA regulations also require that every airport maintain
secured areas, which are defined as portions of the airport where passengers and cargo board, and
where domestic and foreign aircraft deplane. 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5 (2008).
79. 49 C.F.R. § 1542.105(c) (2008).
80. 49 C.F.R. § 1542.105(b)(3).
81. 49 C.F.R. § 1540.20 1(b) (2008).
82. 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 (2008).
83. 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111 (a) (2008). Certain law enforcement personnel are exempt from
the weapons ban that applies in secured areas of airports. 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111 (b).
84. 49 C.F.R. §1540.105(a)(1) (2008); TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., ENFORCEMENT SANCTION
GUIDANCE POLICY 10, http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/FrNALSanctionGuidancev 1.12.07.pdf (last
visited Oct. 7, 2009).
85. See Moving Beyond the First Five Years: How the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Will Continue to Enhance Security for All Modes of Transportation:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. and Infrastructure Protection of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 19-30 (2008) (statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, United States Government Accountability Office) (noting
that although TSA has made progress, the agency needs to take further action to achieve the
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D. Federal Court Decisions Reinforce National Regulation ofAviation
Activities Through the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses
Although federal courts have had few occasions to interpret TSA's authority,
given the relative infancy of the agency, they have consistently held that
federal regulators have the power to control aviation under both the Commerce
Clause 86 and the Supremacy Clause.
87
strong, standardized security procedures Congress intended). TSA has implemented a number of
programs at U.S. airports that are designed to increase airport security, including background
checks for employees who work in secured areas, uniform passenger baggage requirements, cargo
screening practices, and uniform criteria for conducting threat assessments at U.S. airports. See
id; see also Norton, supra note 66, at 1119 (describing TSA's airport security screening
requirements for passengers and cargo as "long, complex, and comprehensive" because the
screening requirements impose strict hiring criteria for screeners, demand strict time limits for
compliance, and impose tough penalties upon individuals who interfere with a screener's security
duties).
86. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating air commerce. Federal
control is intensive and exclusive."); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 814
(2d Cir. 1956) (affirming the trial court's decision that Congress had the power to regulate air
space and aviation under the Commerce Clause, and that Congress properly exercised this power
when it enacted several pieces of legislation that preempted state regulation of air space);
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871, 878 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) ("Air as an
element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by the commerce clause than is
navigable water."); see also Jackson v. Airways Parking Co., 297 F. Supp. 1366, 1371, 1373-74
(N.D. Ga. 1969) (holding that a parking lot operator's employee was eligible to sue his employer
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, finding that the employee's absence would impede
interstate commerce because he worked for the only parking lot operator near the airport).
87. See, e.g., Frank v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 314 F.3d 195, 197-201 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
defendant's argument that the preemptive effect of an FAA employee drug testing regulation
should be narrowly circumscribed, noting the comprehensive nature of FAA regulations); see also
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1973) (holding that the
FAA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have exclusive authority to regulate noise
emanating from airports, even though such regulation is a firmly rooted state police power,
because the authority granted to the FAA and the EPA is so comprehensive and pervasive as to
render local ordinances preempted); Allegheny Airlines, 238 F.2d at 814, 817 (rejecting a
municipality's claim that its ordinance regulating airspace under one-thousand feet was not
preempted by federal law because Congress did not affirmatively assert authority over airspace
below that altitude, holding that Congress had asserted federal authority to regulate all air space
by giving a federal entity the power to regulate airline take-offs, landings, and airspace to
promote safety and prevent crashes); Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix Grounded: The
Impact of the Supreme Court's Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and Local Impediments
to Airport Expansion, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 941, 965-66 (2003) (explaining that the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, which gave the FAA authority over airport development and flight safety
rules in an effort to secure air commerce, granted the FAA such comprehensive authority that it
would be nearly impossible to find an area of aviation law that the Act did not preempt).
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1. Courts Interpret Aviation as an Integral Component of Interstate
Commerce
a. Defining the Commerce Clause's Claw
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to direct TSA to
regulate airport security. 88  Under Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution, Congress has the authority to regulate interstate commerce.
89
While the Supreme Court has narrowed its interpretation of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause, 90 the Clause nonetheless grants Congress the
authority to regulate channels of interstate commerce,9 1 instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and activities that have significant effects on interstate
commerce.
93
88. Although many recent cases addressing the federal government's power to regulate
aviation do not discuss the Commerce Clause and instead analyze only the Supremacy Clause,
see, e.g., Burbank, 411 U.S. at 625-27; Frank, 314 F.3d at 197-99, federal control over aviation
is historically rooted in the Commerce Clause. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409
U.S. 249, 274 (1972) ("Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation
applicable to all such accidents, whether occurring on land or water, and adapted to the specific
characteristics of air commerce."). Understanding the contemporary dynamics of the Commerce
Clause is, therefore, important to understanding the scope of aviation regulation permitted. L.
Anthony Sutin, Supreme Court Watch, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2002), http://www.abanet.
org/statelocal/lawnews/win02supremect.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009) (explaining that the
Supreme Court's holdings in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison limit
Congress's ability to regulate certain areas of law under the Commerce Clause, but concluding
that the ATSA should not face constitutional challenges under those holdings because air
transportation is a well established channel of commerce).
89. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. During the first half of the twentieth century, a broad
interpretation of the Commerce Clause reshaped the role of the federal government, allowing
Congress to claim constitutional authority to regulate areas of law that had traditionally been left
to state government control. Lamar J. Jost, Constitutional Law-The Commerce Clause in the
New Millennium: Enumeration Still Presupposes Something not Enumerated United States v.
Morrison, 120S. Ct. 1740 (2000), 1 WYO. L. REV. 195, 204-206 (2001).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995); see also Jost, supra note
89, at 215-18.
91. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490-91 (4th Cir. 2000) (defining channels of
commerce as including "navigable rivers, lakes, and canals of the United States; the interstate
railroad track system; the interstate highway system; ... interstate telephone and telegraph lines;
air traffic routes; [and] television and radio broadcast frequencies" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
92. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (defining instrumentalities of commerce as "persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities");
see also Goldberg v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 509, 511-12 (N.D. W. Va. 1961)
(finding a military airport to be an instrumentality of commerce because of the activities
occurring within it, including the arrival and departure of flights, the shipment of goods, and the
conduct of interstate training flights).
93. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I1, 125 (1942).
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Over time, Congress's power under the Commerce Clause has ebbed and
flowed. 94 The Supreme Court first defined the scope of the Commerce Clause
in 1824.95 In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court held that the Commerce Clause
granted Congress exclusive authority to govern "commercial intercourse"
among the states. Congressional authority to regulate activities under the
Commerce Clause was expanded further in Wickard v. Filburn.9 7 In applying
the "cumulative effects" test, the Supreme Court found that even intrastate
activities could intrude upon Congress's commerce power if those activities,
when conducted en masse, have a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce. 98  The cumulative effects test gave Congress unprecedented
latitude to exercise broad authority under the Commerce Clause.
99
In a marked shift in its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court constricted the
scope of the Commerce Clause when it decided United States v. Lopez in
1995.100 It continued this trend five years later when it struck down certain
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act in United States v.
Morrison.10 1 Despite legislative findings linking violence against women to
the national economy, the Court held that the effects of violence against
women were not sufficiently related to interstate commerce.' 0 2  The Court
reasoned that if it accepted the link to interstate commerce asserted by the
94. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554-57.
95. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 190-95 (1824) (defining the scope of the Commerce
Clause as providing Congress with the power to regulate all commerce between the United States
and foreign nations, as well as commerce between and "among" states).
96. Id. at 194-95 (explaining that the Commerce power includes the ability to regulate
commerce "among several states"). The Court defined commerce "among several states" to mean
"intermingled with," explaining that Congress could regulate commerce within a state if it had an
overall effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 195. However, the "completely internal commerce
of a State ... may be considered as reserved for the State itself." Id.
97. See generally Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
98. Id. at 125, 127-29 (upholding Congress's right to enforce the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, which set quotas on wheat production and consumption against a sustenance farmer's wheat
grown for personal consumption).
99. Jost, supra note 89, at 207-08.
100. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). In Lopez, the Court invalidated the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which prohibited individuals from carrying firearms in school zones,
holding that the Act exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause because the
prohibited conduct did not affect commerce in any real way. Id. at 551, 563-65, 567. The Court
explained that Congress had failed to include findings establishing a jurisdictional nexus to link
the school gun ban to the chain of commerce. Id. at 561-63, 567. The court ultimately rejected
the government's argument that dangerous or violent school environments prevent students from
learning, thereby reducing students' economic productivity. Id. With respect to Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court held that all powers exercised by Congress have
"judicially enforceable outer limits." Id. at 566.
101. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-17 (2000) (rejecting the argument that
Congress may regulate "noneconomic, violent criminal conduct" based solely on purported
aggregate economic effects).
102. Id.
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government, the resulting precedent would give Congress blanket authority
over police powers traditionally reserved for state governments. 1°3 The Court
declared that the "regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States."
10 4
b. Courts Uphold Federal Legislation Relating to Air Transportation as
Proper under the Commerce Clause
Federal laws regulating airports have been upheld under both the
"substantial effects" and the "channel of commerce" tests.10 5  Despite the
recent trend towards limiting Congress's power under the Commerce Clause,
Wickard's "substantial effects" test remains good law.' 6  For example, in
United States v. Corona, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
Joseph Corona's conviction under a federal arson statute.' 7 Corona argued
that the federal government had no authority to criminalize arson,'08 but the
court held that because Corona was convicted of burning down a building
rented by a taxi company, and the taxi company provided transportation
service to interstate travelers going to and from the airport, his conduct
substantially affected interstate commerce.10 9  The court reasoned that by
burning down the taxi company's building, Corona had frustrated Congress's
interest in "promoting mobility."1 
10
Airports have logically followed as a recognized channel of commerce."I
For example, in Lee v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed Lee's conviction for trafficking stolen securities through
103. Id. at615-16.
104. Id. at 618; see also Sutin, supra note 88.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying
substantial effects test); United States v. West, 562 F.2d 375, 378 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1977)
(recognizing airports as channels of commerce); see also Sutin, supra note 88.
106. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (relying on Wickard and noting that
Congress can regulate noncommercial intrastate activity "if it concludes that failure to regulate
that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity").
107. Corona, 108 F.3d at 571.
108. Id. at 568.
109. Id. at 571. Similarly, in United States v. Hicks, the Seventh Circuit applied the
"aggregate effects" test in upholding a conviction under a federal arson statute, which prohibited
the intentional burning of buildings associated with interstate commerce. United States v. Hicks,
106 F.3d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1997). The defendant had burned down a restaurant with an out of
state insurance policy, and the court reasoned that "it [did not] take any fancy intellectual
footwork to conclude that the aggregate effect of such arsons on commerce is substantial." Id;
see also Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 860-62 (1985) (holding that the statute applied to
commercially owned apartment buildings because the rental of apartment buildings affects
commerce given "the interstate movement of people").
110. Corona, 108 F.3d at 571.
111. United States v. West, 562 F.2d 375, 378 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1977) (recognizing airports as
channels of commerce).
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interstate commerce by carrying them from Illinois to Missouri via a
commercial airline.' 12 Specifically, the court determined that a reasonable jury
could find that Lee's presence in the airport with information regarding an
interstate flight in his possession indicated that he was trafficking securities in
interstate commerce, and the court therefore decided, without discussion, that
airports were a channel of commerce. 11 3 Similarly, in United States v. West,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that a provision of the
United States Code prohibiting theft in airports, among other locations, was
aimed at protecting channels of interstate commerce.14
2. Courts Recognize Federal Regulation ofAviation by Applying the
Supremacy Clause
a. An Overview of Federal Preemption Power under the Supremacy
Clause
State regulations affecting airport security are null and void if they are
preempted by federal law or TSA regulations. 1 5 Article IV, clause 2 of the
Constitution states that "the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the land.' '11 6 Under the
Supremacy Clause, state laws and regulations are preempted by federal statutes
and regulations when federal laws expressly or implicitly manifest an intent to
preempt state laws.' 1 7 Traditionally, the federal government has been required
to clearly express its intent to preempt state law,1 8 particularly when federal
law seeks to supersede traditional state police powers. 119 However, the federal
112. Lee v. United States, 363 F.2d 469, 470, 475-76 (8th Cir. 1966).
113. Id. at 475.
114. West, 562 F.2d at 378 & n.3.
115. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., City of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988); Hill v. Florida ex rel.
Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945) (striking down a state law imposing additional requirements on
union representation because it conflicted with federal laws protecting collective bargaining
rights); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(accepting that Congress's authority to regulate aviation stems from its commerce power, which
preempts state law); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)
(holding that a state law imposing additional requirements on the construction of railway mail
cars was preempted by federal law because Congress thoroughly regulated the railway industry
and uniform compliance was of critical importance).
118. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (summarizing the history of
preemption case law as requiring a "clear and manifest" intent by Congress to preempt state laws
when enacting legislation on matters typically governed by the states (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
119. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973)
(acknowledging that, although noise control is traditionally an issue delegated to the states to
regulate under their police powers, Congress's intent to preempt state law was clear, though not
explicit).
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government can overcome this presumption when the legislation in question
pertains to an area of "unique federal concern."
'1 20
Because the ATSA contains no express language 12proscribing state
legislation, the implied preemption test must be applied. There are two
forms of implied preemption: (1) field preemption and (2) conflict
preemption. 122 Field preemption occurs when congressional regulation of an
activity is so pervasive, or its interest in regulating that activity is so strong,
that it is clear that Congress intended to be the sole regulator of that field.'
Conflict preemption occurs when a state law undermines the objectives of a
federal law.' 
24
The Supreme Court, in Hines v. Davidowitz, enumerated three factors that
courts should consider when determining whether Congress intended to
preclude state legislation in a particular field of law: " [(1)] [t]he nature of the
power exerted by Congress, [(2)] the object sought to be attained, and [(3)] the
character of the obligations imposed by the law."'125 In Hines, the Court struck
down a Pennsylvania statute imposing more burdensome registration
requirements on legal aliens than those required under the federal Alien
Registration Act. 126 The Court noted that the Alien Registration Act was just
one of several pieces of immigration legislation that comprised the
comprehensive naturalization regulatory scheme.' 27 Applying the three field
preemption factors, Justice Black explained that Congress, in accordance with
its constitutional authority to regulate immigration, intended to impose a
uniform national alien registration requirement that accounted for individual
liberty concerns' 28 and national security needs by imposing minimal
registration requirements.' 29  Citing the comprehensive legislative history-
120. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1988) ("[W]here the federal
interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is
replaced by federal rules.").
121. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
122. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000) (recognizing
that field preemption and conflict preemption may, at times, overlap and are not "rigidly distinct"
(quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990))).
123. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
124. Id.
125. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941).
126. Id at 72-74. The Alien Registration Act established a federal registration system for
non-citizens present in the United States. Id. at 59-61. Pennsylvania's registration law was
significantly more burdensome and included provisions that Congress had debated and
deliberately excluded. Id. at 72-73.
127. Id. at 69.
128. Id. at 73-74. The Court examined the history of federal immigration laws and
emphasized Congress's long-standing reluctance to impose regulations upon non-citizens that
intruded upon their liberty or appeared to discriminate overtly. Id. at 69-70. Opponents of
aggressive immigration policies claimed that the registration policy violated the principles of
freedom and liberty upon which this nation was founded. Id. at 71.
129. Id. at 72-74.
[Vol, 59:201
2009] Defining the Scope of TSA 's Authority to Protect Airports 219
including policy compromises deliberately included to achieve agreement-
and the strong interest in uniformity of national immigration laws, the Court
held that Congress clearly intended to regulate immigration registration
procedures fully and, therefore, Pennsylvania's statute could not stand.130
Similarly, in Hill v. Florida, the Supreme Court found that a Florida statute
was preempted because it conflicted with federal law. 131 Although the
regulations imposed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not rise
to the level of field preemption, the Court held that a Florida statute limiting
certain union activities was nonetheless preempted by the NLRA because it
"[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." The Court reasoned that Congress,
through the NLRA, intended to ensure "full freedom" in employees'
bargaining rights and choice of union representation. 33 By allowing only
state-licensed business agents to represent labor unions in bargaining
negotiations, the Florida statute thwarted Congress's goal of providing citizens
"full freedom" in collective bargaining.
134
b. Federal Courts Find that the Supremacy Clause Preempts State and
Local Aviation Rules
Courts have relied on the Supremacy Clause to uphold the expansion of
federal jurisdiction in aviation law. 135 In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a local noise-control ordinance
that restricted the hours during which certain aircraft were permitted to take-off
and land at the Hollywood-Burbank Airport. 3 6  The airport operator
challenged the ordinance on grounds of both field and conflict preemption.
13 7
Although the city of Burbank conceded that the FAA had complete authority to
regulate airspace, it maintained that it had the right to pass ordinances
pertaining to the use of the airport under its police powers.1 38 The Court
observed that although the local ordinance was enacted pursuant to the state's
deeply rooted police power, the application of innumerable municipal noise
ordinances to aircraft take-off and landing would impact flight patterns, which
would inhibit the FAA's ability to facilitate air travel.1 39 The Court interpreted
the authority granted to the FAA under the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise
130. Id. at 73-74.
131. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 539, 542-44 (1945).
132. Id. at 539, 542 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. at 541.
134. Id. at541-42.
135. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 625-26 (1973).
136. Id.
137. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 914, 920 (C.D. Cal.
1970), affd, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
138. LockheedAir Terminal, 411 U.S. at 638; LockheedAir Terminal, 318 F. Supp. at 920.
139. LockheedAir Terminal, 411 U.S. at 638-40.
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Control Act to establish a pervasive field of regulation, impliedly preempting
state law. 1
40
Although some courts have refused to extend Lockheed Air Terminal by
interpreting federal preemption power narrowlY in favor of state law, the
presumption against preemption is in decline.'4  Recent judicial decisions
appear to favor security and uniformity over individual states' laws. 142 While
courts have generally hesitated to preempt state common law claims, 43 they
have readily found state laws preempted in areas of national security and
144
commerce.
140. Id. at 639-40.
141. See, e.g., Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 783-84 (6th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to apply the holding in Lockheed Air Terminal to preempt a local ordinance prohibiting
planes from landing on a local lake, and construing the FAA's scope of preemption power to
extend only to ordinances regulating noise).
142. See Berger, supra note 87, at 949, 985; see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363, 368, 387-88 (2000) (forgoing a presumption against preemption analysis and
preempting a Massachusetts state law penalizing companies for doing business with Burma under
the doctrine of implied preemption because the federal government had already initiated sanctions
against Burma).
143. Perdigao v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 973 So. 2d 33, 37-38 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (ruling that
FAA regulations were not so pervasive as to preempt a state tort claim of false imprisonment
against an airline for prohibiting a man from moving about when his plane sat on the tarmac for
several hours). In Perdigao, a man sued Delta Airlines for boarding passengers onto a plane, only
to have them sit on the runway for eight hours while the flight crew prevented passengers from
moving about the cabin and prohibiting them from obtaining beverages. Id. at 34-35, 38.
Although the court applied the Lockheed Air Terminal holding to the passenger's claim alleging
inadequate service, the court ruled that the claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act,
which prohibits states from imposing service standards on airlines. Id. at 37-38. The court
explained, however, that prohibiting a passenger from moving went beyond "service," and thus
was not subject to preemption. Id. at 38.
144. See Berger, supra note 87, at 949. National security and the need for uniformity have
caused courts to weigh a state's police power and asserted individual liberties less heavily against
national laws. Id. Constitutional rights and principles are not absolute, but have also become
subject to a balancing test, weighing the protection afforded by the Constitution against the need
for intrusion. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting the
passenger's Fourth Amendment claim given that airline security justified conducting a
warrantless search of the passenger's bag after the bag set off the magnetometer); see also City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (distinguishing roadblocks conducted by police
during a routine crime control as violating the Fourth Amendment from checkpoints and police
blocks targeted to thwart terrorists); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Friendly, J., concurring) ("When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions
of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone
meets the test of reasonableness.").
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II. IN ORDER TO FULLY SECURE AIR TRANSPORTATION, TSA MUST HAVE THE
AUTHORITY OVER SECURITY IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF SECURITY CHECK POINTS
A. The Language and Legislative History of the A TSA Show that Congress
Authorized TSA to Regulate Airport Security, Not Just Checkpoint Security
Congress charged TSA with implementing security procedures to prevent
acts of terrorism and other criminal activity from being committed against
American transportation infrastructure, particularly aviation.145 If the scope of
TSA's authority is limited to security checkpoints and the areas beyond those
checkpoints, TSA will not be able to effectively execute its aviation security
mission. Applying principles of statutory construction to interpret the powers
Congress delegated to TSA by enacting the ATSA, it is clear that TSA's broad
authority to impose security policies extends to the entire premises of an
airport. 1
46
1. The Plain Language of the ATSA
Congress expressly granted TSA authority over airport security under the
ATSA. 147  When discerning the meaning of a statute, courts begin by
examining the text and assume that the words used carry their ordinary
meaning. If the meaning is clear, the analysis 
ends there. 49
The ATSA states that TSA shall "oversee the implementation, and ensure
the adequacy, of security measures at airports."' 50 The term "airport" is
defined in several sections of the United States Code, but no definition limits
an airport only to security checkpoints and the areas beyond those
checkpoints.1 5 1  A plain meaning interpretation of the ATSA, therefore,
dictates that TSA has the authority to regulate security throughout airports.
145. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 714-17.
146. See infra Part II.A. 1, 2.
147. 49 U.S.C. § 114(0(11) (2006).
148. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 178, 183-84 (2004) (rejecting the
government's claim that sand and gravel were "valuable minerals" for purposes of the Pittman
Act because the Court assumed Congress intended for the language used in drafting the bill to
have its ordinary meaning); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 36, at § 46:1 (elaborating on several
interpretations of the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, but concluding that when
statutory language clearly and unambiguously demonstrates a legislature's objectives, courts
cannot use canons of construction to give the statute a new meaning).
149. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 183.
150. 49U.S.C. § 114(0(11).
151. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(9) (2006) (defining airport as "a landing area used regularly
by aircraft for receiving or discharging passengers or cargo"); 49 U.S.C. § 47102(2)(A) (2006)
(defining airport as: "(i) an area of land or water used or intended to be used for the landing and
taking off of aircraft; (ii) an appurtenant area used or intended to be used for airport buildings or
other airport facilities or rights of way; and (iii) airport buildings and facilities located in any of
those areas...").
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Additionally, when reading the statute in its entirety, it becomes even clearer
that the ATSA charges TSA with regulating airport security outside of secured
areas and security checkpoints.' This additional consideration is important
because courts interpret individual words used in legislation in the context of
the entire statute to arrive at a reasonable definition. 153 The ATSA references
"secure areas" as a part of an airport1 54 and discusses TSA's security screening
responsibilities.1 55 Given the distinct reference to each area, and applying the
ordinary meaning of each word, the word "airport" in the ATSA is not limited
to security checkpoints or the areas beyond them.
Moreover, statutes are to be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to every
word and clause.' 56 Congress granted TSA complete authority over security
screening personnel and equipment, and over approving protective measures to
prevent unauthorized access to secured areas.1" While Congress's directives
to TSA regarding checkpoint security and the protection of secured areas are
specific as to procedure and location,1 58 the ATSA includes language
specifically granting TSA power to oversee "airport" security. 159  If TSA's
authority was limited to secure areas and security checkpoints, the provision
granting TSA power to implement and oversee airport security would be
superfluous. In addition, Congress also gave TSA broad discretionary
authority to "carry out such other duties, and exercise such other powers... as
the Under Secretary considers appropriate. ' 6  Limiting TSA's regulatory
authority to secure areas and checkpoints would render whole provisions of the
ATSA superfluous, violating a longstanding canon of statutory construction.161
152. See49U.S.C. § 114.
153. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940) ("To take a few
words from their context and with them thus isolated to attempt to determine their meaning,
certainly would not contribute greatly to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a
statute.").
154. 49 U.S.C. § I14(f)(12).
155. Id. § 114(e).
156. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,' rather than to emasculate an entire section."
(internal citation omitted)); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 36, at § 46:6 ("No clause, sentence or
word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if a purpose can be found which will
give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.").
157. 49 U.S.C. § I 14(d)(1), (e), (f).
158. Id. § Il14(e), (f)(14).
159. Id. § 114(f)(11).
160. Id. § 114(f)(15).
161. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 36, at §46:6. While an Airport Safety Plan currently
focuses primarily upon preventing unauthorized entrance of secured areas and circumvention of
mandatory passenger screening, TSA has, since its inception, facilitated programs to promote
security outside airport security checkpoints. 49 U.S.C. § 114(e); 49 C.F.R. § 1542.103 (2008).
For example, the ATSA itself included a reimbursement program to be administered by TSA that
would compensate airport operators and vendors for costs associated with complying with new
airport parking lot security requirements imposed after September 11, 2001. Richard P.
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2. Congressional Debate During Enactment of the ATSA
Although Congress clearly intended to federalize airport security,
162
Congress did not explicitly define the physical boundaries beyond which
TSA's authority does not extend. 16 3  When a court is unable to decipher
Congress's intent through a textual analysis of the statute, the next step is to
examine the legislative history to determine the drafters' intent.' In
evaluating congressional intent, "the goal is not to look at a general legislative
aim or purpose, but instead to see more particularly how the enacting
legislature would have resolved the question." 6 5 Useful factors for analyzing
legislative history include the statute's structure, as well as the purpose and
intent of the legislation.
1 66
Congress passed the ATSA only days before Thanksgiving in 2001, seeking
both to restore public confidence in air travel and to prevent another terrorist
attack.16 7  During Senate consideration of the ATSA Conference Report,
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) stated that the bill would "begin a process ... of
increasing airport security, of putting in place procedures and individuals who
will [provide] Americans much greater, dramatically enhanced safety and
security in airports and on airliners.' ' 168  Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV)
echoed Senator McCain's sentiments, adding that "[a]irport security is no
longer just a transportation issue, it is a national security concern, and the
Federal Government will now take on this critical responsibility." 169 These
comments are just two examples among dozens of statements made by both
Campbell, America Acts: Swift Legislative Responses to the September 11 Attacks, 69 DEF.
COUNs. J. 139, 143 n.9 (2002).
162. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(e), (f).
163. See id. § 114(d)-(f).
164. Russell v. United States, 551 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2008) (reviewing the legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended to preempt state law in resolving federal tax lien
issues). Law professor Cass R. Sunstein argues that the use of legislative intent, as ascertained
from congressional debate, to resolve questions of law has the effect of imposing law that was
never enacted, resulting in an unwarranted application of the law. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 430-34 (1989). Sunstein notes,
however, that using legislative intent to resolve questions of ambiguity can be appropriate when
the interpretation is corroborated by similar conclusions derived from other principles of
interpretation. See id
165. Sunstein, supra note 164, at 429.
166. Id. at 426.
167. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Hawley, 543 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2008)
(acknowledging that "national security" concerns motivated Congress to enact the ATSA
quickly); Dempsey, supra note 20, at 714 ("In order to restore the public's confidence in flying,
three days before Thanksgiving 2001, the U.S. Congress passed [the] ATSA.").
168. 147 CONG. REc. SI,976 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(emphasis added).
169. 147 CONG. REC. Sll,982 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller)
(emphasis added).
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senators and representatives that indicate an intention to delegate broad airport
security to TSA.
170
As TSA grapples with defining the scope of its authority, the legislative
history of the ATSA strongly indicates that TSA is empowered to impose
transportation security regulations throughout airports. 17  Given the fear of
flying most Americans experienced after September 11,172 the financial
troubles airlines faced as a result, 173 the pressure on Congress to restore
confidence in air travel, 174 and the express statements made by lawmakers and
the President hailing the full federalization of airport security, 75 it is unlikely
that Congress would have carved out portions of the airport for TSA to govern,
while leaving the remainder of the premises beyond its reach. 
176
B. Supreme Court Decisions Illuminating the Scope of Both the Commerce
Clause and the Supremacy Clause to Support Congress's Ability to Delegate
Airport Security to TSA
1. Ensuring the Security ofAirports Is So Closely Related to Commerce that
It Warrants Federal Regulation
When Congress first began regulating the use of national airways, it foresaw
air travel as being inextricably linked to the realization of the full potential of
170. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S11,983 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry)
("For too long the FAA, airports, airlines and private security companies have been able to point
fingers at one another without any real improvements being made in security. The Congress has
passed law upon law designed to improve things, but these laws never seemed to be fully
implemented. That all ends with the passage of this legislation. . . . The Congress has
empowered the Federal Government to make serious and lasting improvements in airport
security." (emphasis added)); 147 CONG. REC. S11,980 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Warner) ("I am very pleased that House and Senate negotiators have reached agreement...
to fully federalize security at every airport in the United States."); 147 CONG. REC. S 11,978
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hutchison) ("We are securing the top of the airplane.
We are securing the bottom of the airplane. We are securing the cockpit of the airplane. We are
securing the airports through which people go."); 147 CONG. REC. H8303 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
2001) (statement of Rep. Ehlers) ("[T]he major gain in the bill is that we have Federal control
over the [baggage and security screening] process, we have the Federal Government setting the
rules.... All of this ensures uniformity from airport to airport."). Even President Bush, as he
signed the ATSA into law on November 19, 2001, emphasized the new, powerful role that TSA
would play by stating, "[flor the first time, airport security will become a direct federal
responsibility." President Signs Aviation Legislation, Nov. 19, 2001, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011119-2.html.
171. See supra Part II.A.; see also Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees TSA Local 1 v. Hawley,
481 F. Supp. 2d 72, 94 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that the ATSA caption reads: "'An act to improve
airport security, and for other purposes"' (internal citation omitted)).
172. See Dempsey, supra note 20, at 714.
173. See id. at 712.
174. See id. at 712, 714.
175. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
176. See Krause, supra note 18, at 244, 247-50.
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the American economy. 177 As new threats to air travel emerged-ranging
from unexplained plane crashes to a surge in hijacking incidents-Congress
has enacted legislation to confront those threats, keep Americans safe, and
ensure public confidence in air travel. 178 Congress exercised its Commerce
Clause power to protect infrastructure critical to the economy from physical
attack by enacting the ATSA.
1 79
Even in light of the Supreme Court's narrower interpretation of the
Commerce Clause articulated in Lopez,180 the ATSA's assertion of federal
authority to regulate airport security would survive a Commerce Clause
challenge. Specifically, federal regulation of airport security likely meets both
the "substantial effects" and "channel of commerce" tests outlined in Lopez
and Morrison. 1
81
a. "Substantial Effects " Test and Airport Security
In United States v. Corona, the Court found that burning down a taxi
company's building substantially affected interstate commerce because the fire
interfered with out-of-state residents' ability to travel, particularly because the
company provided service to the airport. 182 The Corona Court determined that
the nexus between the federal arson statute and interstate commerce implicated
Congress's interest in protecting efficient travel, thus permitting federal arson
laws that would protect such travel. 1
83
Incidents in airport buildings also substantially affect interstate commerce.
Since September 11, 2001, even accidental security breaches that resulted in no
serious injuries have had significant effects on both air travel and the public's
perception of aviation security. For example, in 2004, four terminals at Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX) were evacuated and roads surrounding
the airport were closed after an unidentified man with a boarding pass
bypassed security screening by entering the terminal through an exit."' On the
same day at LAX, a small flashlight exploded during baggage screening.,
85
Together, the two incidents affected nearly 10,000 passengers, activated the
emergency response of 200 state and federal law enforcement officials,
177. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (noting
"[t]he continuing growth of public acceptance of aviation as a major force in passenger
transportation and the increasingly significant role of commercial aviation in the nation's
economy").
178. Gelder, supra note 45, at 1214; supra note 42.
179. Krause, supra note 18, at 250.
180. See supra note 100.
181. See id; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609, 618 (2000).
182. United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565, 571 (5th Cir. 1997).
183. Id
184. Jennifer Oldham et al., 2 Incidents Force LAX to Evacuate 4 Terminals, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2004, at A 1.
185. Id.
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delayed the departure or arrival of nearly 250 flights, and caused 20,000 cars to
be rerouted due to road closures. 186 Not only did these two airport incidents
interfere with the mobility of thousands of people, they cost the airlines and
affected travelers large sums of money.' 87 Considering the court's analysis in
Corona, airports substantially affect interstate commerce, rendering them
subject to federal authority in their entirety.' 88
Even if airports are determined not to substantially affect interstate
commerce, air transportation and airports have been accepted as a channel of
interstate commerce.189
b. Airports as Channels of Interstate Commerce
As channels of commerce, airports may be regulated by federal law under
the Commerce Clause.190 Because Congress has the power to regulate airports
under the Commerce Clause, it can delegate that authority to TSA.
91
2. By Enacting the A TSA and Similar Security Statutes, Congress has
Established its Intent to Preempt State Regulation
TSA regulations either implicitly preempt state laws governing airport
security or are frustrated by state laws and regulations. 192  Assessing
congressional intent is the first step in determining the scope of field
preemption. 193 Congressional intent to preempt state law is implied when laws
or regulations are so pervasive so as to preclude state law, or when Congress
has manifested a strong interest in governing a particular activity or area.
194
Congress has a long history of regulating aviation security.1 95  TSA was
created to pursue the security goals of the FAA more aggressively and to
186. Id In a similar incident at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in
November 2001, Delta Airlines lost between six and eight million dollars when it was forced to
shut down its terminal after law enforcement ordered the terminal evacuated because a man
breached security to retrieve his camera bag. Nancy Fonti & Craig Schneider, Lasseter Facing
Suit byAirTran, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 27, 2001, at B2.
187. Fonti & Schneider, supra note 186.
188. See Corona, 108 F.3d at 569, 571.
189. See supra Part I.D. I.b.
190. See supra note 100 and Part I.D. 1.
191. See supra Part I.A.
192. See Berger, supra note 87, at 950-51, 980-81 (2003) (synthesizing the impact of the
proprietary power exception to FAA regulations and case law narrowly interpreting this
exception, concluding that the proprietary power of airport operators is limited to regulations that
do not impede the goals of federal regulations designed to protect air travel).
193. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86, 496 (1996); Orelski v. Pearson, 337
F. Supp. 2d 695, 699-700 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (determining that the ATSA preempted state common
law claims after analyzing the historical backdrop of the ATSA and Congress's swift response in
federalizing airport security after September 11,2001).
194. See Orelski, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 699, 702.
195. See supra Part I.B.
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establish security guidelines for airports, not just aircraft. 196  The ATSA
directed TSA to take specific precautions at security checkpoints' 97 and to
assess and coordinate responses to new threats to aviation and other
transportation systems.' 98  Pursuant to its statutory authorization, TSA has
implemented its own comprehensive regulation scheme pertaining to airport
security. 199 Bearing in mind the pervasive regulatory scheme prescribed by the
ATSA and TSA's regulations, it is apparent that both Congress and TSA
intended for federal law to regulate airport security.
200
Moreover, the federal government has a strong interest in ensuring aviation
security and the long-term viability of the aviation industry.20' Airports and
aviation are not only essential to the national economy, 202 they are also
203documented terrorist targets °. Congress demonstrated its interest in
establishing a national, uniform airport security system to shore up the aviation
industry and prevent terrorist attacks when it shifted responsibility for
checkpoint procedures from private air carriers to TSA, and further directed
204TSA to approve airport security plans °. Considering the manner in which
Congress deliberated over the ATSA, its history in regulating aviation security,
and its goals of achieving national security and protecting the economy, it is
apparent that Congress has a strong interest in TSA exercising exclusive
authority over airport security.
205
Courts will also find conflict preemption when state laws seek to regulate
airport security in competition with already existing federal laws. 2 06 In Hill v.
Florida, the Court determined that a Florida statute limiting collective
bargaining rights guaranteed by federal statute conflicted with federal law.
207
Similarly, airport security regulations separately promulgated by individual
municipalities would result in the patchwork airport security scheme that
208Congress intended to avoid. Likewise, local regulations hindering TSA's
ability to prevent crimes and violence in areas outside security checkpoints
196. See Francine Kerner & Margot Bester, The Birth of the Transportation Security
Administration: A View From the Chief Counsel, 17 AIR & SPACE LAW 1, 21-22 (2002)
(chronicling the history of TSA, the impetus behind its creation, and its shift to DHS; and
detailing TSA's specific mandates to shore up aviation security).
197. 49 U.S.C. § 114(e) (2006).
198. Id. § 114(0.
199. See id. § 114(l); supra Part I.C.
200. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
201. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 712-14.
202. See Zuckman, supra note 21.
203. See KIRK, supra note 73, at 4.
204. See supra Part I.B., II.A.2.
205. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941).
206. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 539, 542 (1945).
207. Id. at 542.
208. See supra Part I.B.
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would also undermine the comprehensive federal airport security system
intended under the ATSA.2 °9
III. TSA'S FAILURE TO BROADLY INTERPRET ITS AUTHORITY JEOPARDIZES
AVIATION SECURITY AND UNDERMINES ITS CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE
Having established that the federal government has authority to regulate all
aspects of airport security under the Commerce Clause and state attempts to
regulate airport security should be preempted by federal law, it is clear that
TSA has the authority to regulate airport security. Therefore, TSA should
honor the city of Atlanta's request to modify the security plan for the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport to prohibit individuals from
carrying concealed firearms. Indeed, if TSA rejects the City's application to
modify its Airport Security Plan because it believes it lacks the authority, it
would abdicate its congressionally mandated responsibility to take whatever
security measures are necessary to ensure airport security. If TSA narrowly
interprets what Congress intended to be broad authority, TSA also would limit
its ability to issue necessary transportation security regulations in the future. 21
TSA has no constitutional authority to act unless Congress delegates
regulatory authority that is limited by an intelligible principle. 2 1  Congress
clearly and unambiguously manifested its intent to delegate authority to TSA
when it granted TSA broad power to take the actions necessary to protect the
213viability and security of air travel. A critical aspect of aviation security is
airport security.214  Congress made clear, by enacting the ATSA, that it
215intended for TSA to oversee security procedures throughout airports.
Because Congress clearly and unambiguously articulated TSA's authority,
TSA has no power to replace Congress's policy with its own. 2 16  Further,
asserting TSA's authority to regulate airports under the broad authority vested
209. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)-(f) (2006).
210. See id. § 114(e),(f).
211. See Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1065-66, 1068 (2005) (arguing that a court ought to regard an agency's
interpretative rule with strong deference, requiring only that the interpretation be a reasonable
construction of the statute and that it demonstrates a commitment to that interpretation); Quincy
M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that Delimit the Scope of
the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 958, 960-61 (1994) (discussing the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.
Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988), which concluded that an agency's interpretation of its jurisdiction is
entitled to deference as long as it is a "permissible construction of the statute").
212. See supra Part I.A.
213. See49U.S.C. § 114(0(12)--(15).
214. See Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, supra note 71.
215. See supra Part II.A.2.
216. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 36, at § 65:1 ("Where an agency has been charged
with administering law, it may not substitute its own policy for that of the legislature."); supra
Part I.A.
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in it by Congress would comport with the delegation doctrine because its
authority is defined by an intelligible principle.2 Should TSA deny its
authority to regulate airports, it would fail to execute its congressionally
mandated order and undermine the goals Congress sought to achieve in
enacting the ATSA and other aviation-related statutes.
21 8
By creating TSA, Congress sought to establish an agency that would
preserve the viability of air commerce and address threats to aviation
security. 219 The dangers of concealed firearms pose a substantial threat to
economic and personal security. 22°  According to the Assistant General
Manager of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, gunfire at the
airport would result in chaos and a "stampede. '221 It is well documented that
concealed firearms can be, and often are, discharged accidentally.
222
Accidental or purposeful discharge of firearms would result in large-scale
evacuations or worse, rendering airports a dangerous battleground in which
citizens, surrounded by fully fueled airplanes, take law enforcement into their
own hands. 223 If TSA refuses to embrace its statutory authority to prevent
armed citizens from patrolling American airports, it will be abdicating its
congressional mandate to preserve both the viability of air carriers and public
confidence in flying.
224
V. CONCLUSION
The American aviation industry faces historic threats of attack and
disruption by terrorists and other criminals. Another attack like the one carried
out on September 11, 2001, would paralyze the national economy and result in
another devastating death toll. To thwart future attacks against air travel-a
top terrorist target-Congress created TSA to serve as the central command for
aviation security. In doing so, Congress purposefully equipped TSA with
broad authority to regulate all activities and components of air travel necessary
to prevent another terrorist attack.
Through the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, Congress delegated to TSA
the power to regulate airport security. TSA's mission is broad in scope and is
intended to be executed aggressively. If TSA fails to take over airport security,
the aviation industry will remain vulnerable to future attacks and the American
economy, which relies heavily on the multi-billion dollar industry, will suffer
217. See supra Part I.A.
218. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)-(f) (2006).
219. See supra Part I.B.
220. See Rankin, supra note 14.
221. Id.
222. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREvENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
WISQARS, INJURY MORTALITY REPORTS, http://webapp.cdc.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe (reporting
789 deaths from unintentional shootings in 2005) (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).
223. See Rankin, supra note 14.
224. See 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2006).
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the consequences. Moreover, by narrowly construing its authority with respect
to aviation, TSA will set a precedent for interpreting its authority in a manner
that limits its power to regulate other modes of transportation. Congress did
not intend these consequences. In order to pursue the goals established under
the ATSA, TSA must assert its authority to regulate security throughout
airports and grant the city of Atlanta's request to ban concealed firearms at its
airport.
